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Abstract
Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes
practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and
can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use
Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism
in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our
formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing
ethics and ultimately the question of how to “make the world better” with
a formal basis.
Keywords: preference utilitarianism, formalization, artificial life, (machine)
ethics
1 Introduction
Usually, ethical imperatives are not formulated with sufficient precision to study
them and their realization mathematically. (McLaren, 2011, p. 297; Gips, 2011,
p. 251) In particular, it is impossible to implement them on an intelligent
machine to make it behave benevolently in our universe, which is the subject
of a field known as Friendly AI (e.g. see Yudkowsky, 2001, p. 2) or machine
ethics (e.g. see M. Anderson and S. L. Anderson, 2011, p. 1). Whereas existing
formalizations of utilitarian ethics have been successfully applied to economics,
they are incomplete due to the nature of their dualistic world model in which
agents are assumed to be ontologically fundamental.
In this paper however, we take the following steps towards a workable and
simple formalization of preference utilitarianism1 in physical world models:
• We describe the problem of informality in ethics and the shortcomings of
previous dualist approaches to formalizing utilitarian ethics (section 2).
∗The final publication in the journal Synthese is openly accessible at Springer via http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0883-1. This version contains insignificant changes.
1For introductions to and ethical discussions of the underlying notion of preference utilitari-
anism see Tomasik (2015a) and Tomasik (2015b).
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• We justify cellular automata as a world model, use Bayes’ theorem to
extract utility functions from a given space-time embedded agent and
introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism (section 3).
• We compare our approach with existing work in ethics, game theory and
artificial intelligence (section 4). Our formalization is novel but nevertheless
relates to a growing movement to treat agents as embedded into the
environment.
2 The problem of formalizing ethics in physical
systems
Discussion on informally specified moral imperatives can be difficult due to
different interpretations of the texts describing the imperative. Thus, formalizing
moral imperatives could augment informal ethical discussion. (Gips, 2011, p. 251;
S. L. Anderson, 2011; Dennett, 2006; Moor, 2011, p. 19)
Furthermore, science and engineering answer formally described questions
and solve well-specified tasks, but are not immediately applicable to the informal
question of how to make the world “better”.
This problem has been identified in economics and game theory, which has
led to some very useful formalizations of utilitarianism (e.g. Harsanyi, 1982).
However, their formalization relies on consciousness-matter dualism: The
agents are not part of the physical world or embedded into it, so that their
thoughts or computations can not be influenced by physical laws. Also, agents’
utility functions are assumed to not depend on the agents (or their physical
configurations) themselves. These are typical assumptions in game theory.
After all, game theory is about games, in which players are not actually inside
the game, nor can they decide themselves what goals to pursue. This classic
(multi-)agent-environment model is depicted in figure 1.
Our world, however, is (usually presumed to be) a purely physical system:
Ethically relevant entities (animals etc.) are embedded in the environment. For
example, our brains behave according to the same laws of physics as the rest
of the world. Also, happiness and preferences are not given by predetermined
utility functions or rewards from the environment, but are the result of physical
processes in our bodies. Therefore, dualist descriptions and formalizations leave
questions unanswered: (compare Orseau and Ring, 2012)
• What objects are ethically relevant? (What are the agents of our non-
dualist world?)
• What is a space-time embedded agent’s or, more generally, an object’s
utility function?
Thus, even though classic formalizations of (preferentist) utilitarianism in
the agent-environment-model can formalize the vague notions of goals and
preferences with utility functions, these formalizations are incomplete, at least
in our physical, non-dualist world.
2
Figure 1: The classic agent-environment-model
3 A Bayesian approach to formalizing preference
utilitarianism in physical systems
3.1 Cellular automata as non-dualist world models
To overcome the described problems of dualist approaches to utilitarianism, we
first have to choose a new, physical setting for our ethical imperative. Instead
of employing string theory and other contemporary theoretical frameworks, we
choose a model that is much more simple to handle formally: cellular automata.
These have sometimes even been pointed out to be candidates for modeling our
own universe, (Wolfram, 2002, ch. 9; Schmidhuber, 1999; Zuse, 1967; Zuse, 1969)
but even if physics will prove cellular automata to be a wrong model, they may
still be of instrumental value for the purpose of this paper. (compare Downey,
2012, pp. 70f., 77-79; Hawking and Mlodinow, 2010, ch. 8)
For detailed introductions to classic cellular automata with neighbor-based
rules, see Wolfram (2002) or Shiffman (2012, ch. 7) for a purely informal and
Wolfram (1983) for a slightly more technical treatment that focuses on one-
dimensional cellular automata. In section 3.1.1, we will consider a generalized
and relatively simple formalism, which is not limited to rules that only depend
on neighbors of a cell.
In CA, it is immediately clear that for a (preference) utilitarian morality we
have to answer the questions that are avoided by assuming a set of agents and
their utility functions to be known from the beginning. It also frees us from
many ethical intuitions that we build up specifically for our own living situations
and reduces moral intuition to its very fundamentals.
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Figure 2: A state of a two-dimensional cellular automaton. It
is very unclear, what agents are and which preferences they have.
Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway%27s_Game_of_Life#
mediaviewer/File:Conways_game_of_life_breeder.png
Figure 2 shows a state of a cellular automaton illustrating the problem of
defining utilitarianism or any other ethical imperative in physical models. Clearly,
many intuitions are very difficult (if not impossible) to formulate universally and
precisely in CA. Thereby, the required formality helps in choosing and defining
an ethical imperative.
3.1.1 A formal introduction to cellular systems
We now introduce some very basic notation and terminology of cellular systems,
a generalization of classic cellular automata, thus setting the scene for our ethical
imperative.
For given sets A and B, let AB denote the set of functions from B to A. A
cellular system is a triple (C, S, d) of a countable set of cells C, a finite set of cell
states S and a function d : SC → SC that maps a world state s : C → S onto its
successor. So basically a world consists of a set of cells that can have different
values and a function that models deterministic state-transitions.2
Cells of cellular systems do not necessarily have to be on a regular grid and
computing new states does not have to be done via neighbor-based lookup tables.
This makes formalization much easier.
But before anything else, we have to define structures which represent objects
in our cellular systems. A space Spc ⊆ C in a cellular system (C, S, d) is a
finite subset of the set of cells C. A structure str on a space Spc is a function
str : Spc → S that maps the cells of the space onto cell values.
2The choice of deterministic systems was made primarily to simplify the formalization. It
appears to be unproblematic to transfer formal preference utilitarianism to non-deterministic
systems, but defining non-deterministic cellular automata themselves is a little more difficult.
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A history is a function h : N→ SC that maps natural numbers as time steps
onto states of the system. For example, the history hs of an initial state s can
then be defined recursively by hs(n) = d(hs(n− 1)) for n ≥ 1 with the base case
hs(0) = s.
3.2 Posterior probabilities and the priority of a (given)
goal to a given agent
Before extracting preferences from a given structure, we have to decide on a
model of preferences. Preferences themselves are mere orderings of alternative
outcomes or lotteries over these outcomes with the outcomes being entire histories
h ∈ (SC)N in our case. The problem is that this makes it difficult to compare
two outcomes when the preferences of multiple individuals are involved. To be
able to make such comparisons, we move from orderings to utility functions
u :
(
SC
)N → R that map histories of the world onto their (cardinal) utilities.3
This will make it possible to just add up the utilities of different individuals and
then compare the sum among outcomes. This by no means “solves” the problem
of interpersonal comparison of utility. Rather, it makes it more explicit. For
example, a given set of preferences is represented equally well by u and 2 · u,
but ceteris paribus 2 · u will make the preferences more significant in summation.
Different approaches to the problem have been proposed. (Hammond, 1989)
In this paper we will ignore the problem (or hope that the fair treatment in
determining all individuals’ utility functions induces moral permissibility). Now
we ask the question: Does a particular structure str want to maximize some
utility function u?
It is fruitful to think about how one would approach such questions in
our world, when encountering some very odd organism. At least one possible
approach would be to put it into different situations or environments and see
what it does to them. If the structure increases some potential utility function
in different environments, it seems as if this utility function represents an aspect
of the structure’s preferences.4
However, for some utility functions it is not very special that their values are
increased and then it might just be coincidence that the structure in question
also does so. For example, it is usually not considered a structure’s preference
to increase entropy even if entropy increases in environments including this
structure, because an increase in entropy is extremely common with or without
the structure.
Also, we feel that some utility functions are less likely than others by them-
selves, e.g. because they are very complex or specific.
But how can we formally capture these notions?
3Other codomains of utility functions seem possible as long as they are subsets of a totally
ordered vector space over R. Intervals like [0, 1] seem specifically suitable, because they avoid
problems of infinite utility and allow for normalization. (Isbell, 1959)
4Alternatively, one can try to avoid this hypothetical experiment by predicting the organism’s
behavior. For example, one could try to ask the organism what it would do or infer its typical
behavior from its internals.
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Since uncertainty is involved, we interpret the degree to which a utility
function u is important to some structure str that exists at time step i as the
posterior probability of that utility function given the structure, a probability we
denote by P (u|str@i), where str@i denotes the event that str exists in time step
i.5 Here, the utility function is interpreted as a hypothesis about the structure’s
“true intentions”6. In a purely physical, non-dualist world there is nothing but
the structure itself, of course. Therefore, the “true intentions” do not really
exist, which makes it still hard to know what P (u|str@i) is supposed to mean.
To finally overcome this problem, we will equate intention and purpose, i.e. we
equate the following interpretations of u as a hypothesis explaining the data
str@i: (compare Dennett, 1989, pp. 289ff., 299f., 318, 320f.)
• The utility function u is the goal of structure str
• Maximizing u was the goal of an entity that chose str .
The second interpretation is more useful, because it describes a data-generating
process and thus comes closer to typical statistical models. Thus, we have to find
the posterior probability of some model (a utility function) given some data (a
structure). For this problem Bayes’ theorem suggests itself, because it provides
an equation for posterior probabilities. In our case, Bayes’ theorem can be used
to infer the likelihood that some utility function was a goal when a structure was
chosen from some priors and the likelihood of choosing the structure given that
the goal is to maximize the utility function. Specifically, Bayes’ theorem gives us
P (u|str@i) = P (str@i|u) · P (u)
P (str@i)
, (1)
where P (u) and P (str@i) are prior probability distributions of utility functions
and structures, respectively, and P (str@i|u) is the probability of (some hypo-
thetical entity choosing) str at time step i when u is to be maximized. Whereas
5Including i into the data is important, because otherwise identical structures at different
points in time would have identical utility functions. This is a problem, when the utility
function u is applied to the whole history, because then structures cannot have preferences
about themselves (“personal happiness”) without also having preferences about all other
identical structures (at the same place). An alternative would be to apply utility functions
only to the part of the history from the point of the existence of the structure onwards, so that
identical structures at different points in time have equal utility functions that are applied
differently. However, it seems like this neglects that the past can depend on the action of an
agent in the present, as illustrated in Newcomb’s paradox by Nozick (1969).
6Intuitively, some structures can have more than one utility function, while others have
no utility function at all. One way to model this would be to understand different utility
functions as events in separate sample spaces. So, the sum
∑
u P (u|str) could vary among
different structures str . A similar scenario is the inference of multiple diseases from a set of
symptoms. (Charniak, 1983) While some individuals may have no diseases or preferences at
all, others may be thought of as having more than one disease or utility function. In more
technical terms, for each utility function there would be a sample space of having that utility
function and not having that utility function.
In this paper however, we will assume mutual exclusivity and collective exhaustiveness of
utility functions. All utility functions live in the same sample space and thus
∑
u P (u|str) = 1
for all structures str . This does not mean that all structures have equal moral standing: The
idea is that “meaningless” structures str have high P (u|str) only for constant utility functions
u, i.e. for “don’t care”-utility functions, which are irrelevant for decision making.
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P (u|str@i) is very hard to grasp intuitively, it is more clear what the proba-
bility distributions on the right hand side of the equation mean. Nevertheless,
they do not correspond to measurable probability distributions like the results
from rolling a dice. Indeed, P (u) and P (str@i) are ultimately subjective (e.g.
see Olshausen, 2004, pp. 1f. Robert, 1994, p. 9) and P (str@i|u) depends on
what exactly the hypothesis u is supposed to express, thus leaving our ethical
imperative parametrized by these distributions.
Nonetheless, there seem to be canonical approaches. P (str@i|u) should be
understood as the probability that str is chosen at time step i by an approximately
rational agent that wants to maximize u. So, structures that are better at
maximizing or more suitable for u should receive higher P (str@i|u) values.
This corresponds to the assumption of (approximate) rationality in Dennett’s
intentional stance. (Dennett, 1989, pp.21,49f.) Unfortunately, the debate about
causal and evidential decision theory (e.g. Peterson, 2009, ch. 9) shows that
formalizing the notion of rational choice is difficult.
The prior of utility functions P (u) on the other hand should denote the
“intrinsic plausibility” of a goal u. That does not have to mean defining and
excluding “evil” or “banal” utility functions. In the preference extraction context,
utility functions are models or hypotheses that explain the behavior of a structure.
And Solomonoff’s formalization of Occam’s razor is often cited as a universal
prior distribution of hypotheses. (Legg, 1997) It assumes complicated hypotheses
(utility functions), i.e. ones that require more symbols to be described in some
programming language, to be less likely than simpler ones.
If utility functions are conceived of as competing hypotheses (see footnote 6),
then
P (str@i) =
∑
u
P (str@i|u) · P (u).
Otherwise, P (str@i) could potentially be chosen more freely.
Finally, note how Bayes’ theorem catches our intuitions from above, especially
when assuming probability distributions similar to the suggested ones: When
some structure str maximizes some utility function u very well, then P (str@i|u)
and thereby the relevance of the utility function to the object would increase.
On the other hand, if many other structures are comparably good, then the
probability for each one to be chosen when given the utility function is smaller
(due to the sum of the probabilities of all possible structures on a given space
and time step being 1) and the probability of the utility function being a real
preference would decrease with it. Finally, multiplying by P (u) catches abstruse
utility functions, e.g. utility functions that are specifically suited to be fulfilled
by the structure in question.
3.3 An individual structure’s welfare function
Having introduced a way of determining how likely it is that some utility function
is the utility function of some object, we define the welfare Ustr@i of a structure
str that exists at some step i of a history h, as the weighted sum over all utility
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functions
Ustr@i =
∑
u
P (u|str@i)u(h), (2)
where h is the history and the sum is over all theoretically possible utility
functions u : (SC)N → R.
We call this term expected utility, because this expression is generally used
for adding utilities weighted by their likelihoods, which is a common concept.
However, the term usually suggests that there is also an actual utility. In our
case of ascribing preferences to physical objects however, no such thing exists.
We only imagine there to be some real utility or welfare functions and that we
use Bayesian inference to find them. But in fact, the structure itself is all there
exists and thus the expected utility is as actual as possible.
The sum in the term for expected utility is over an uncountably infinite set,
which can only converge when only countably many summands are non-zero.7
Some other concerns are described in footnote 9 and addressed in footnote 10.
3.4 Summing over all agents
The utilitarian imperative is to maximize a global welfare function that is the
sum of all individuals’ welfare functions. We already defined the welfare function
of single structures. So next we have to define what the set of all agents is
and how to sum over it. As foreshadowed before, we will consider all possible
structures of a cellular automaton using equation 2 and rely on (intuitively)
irrelevant ones to receive high P (u|str@i) values only for constant and therefore
irrelevant utility functions u (see footnote 6). To sum the utility over all agents,
we not only have to sum over all structures in a particular state, but first over
all (discrete) time steps of the history of the cellular automaton world and only
then over all structures in every state. This way, we sum the welfare of all agents
ever coming into existence. For the summands, we can insert the term obtained
in equation 2 ∑
i
∑
str@i
Ustr@i =
∑
i
∑
str@i
∑
u
P (u|str@i)u(h), (3)
where Ustr@i denotes the welfare or utility of the structure str that exists at time
step i, the first sum is over all integers functioning as time steps, the second is
over all structures in h(i) and the third over all possible utility functions.8 So,
7If
∑
u P (u) = 1 (see footnote 6), then this is given automatically. Also, if Solomonoff’s
prior is chosen for P (u), all incomputable utility functions have zero probability. Since the
set of computable functions is countable, only countably many summands could possibly be
non-zero.
8More precisely, but less elegantly, one could write
∞∑
i=0
∑
Spc∈Fin(C)
∑
u:(SC)N→R
u(h)P (u|(h(i)|Spc)@i),
where Fin(C) := {A ⊆ C||A| ∈ N} is the set of finite subsets of C and h(i)|Spc : Spc → S :
c 7→ h(i)(c) is the restriction of the state h(i) to the space Spc and therefore the structure on
that space.
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our formalization of the main imperative of preference utilitarianism turns out
to be nothing more than maximizing global, all-time expected utility (of every
space-time embedded agent that ever comes into existence). In general, the
value of the series depends on the order of these infinite sums.9 Also, the series
can diverge. Nonetheless it may still be usable for comparing histories in many
cases.10
4 Related work
Preferentist utilitarianism has become a common form of utilitarianism in the
second half of the 20th century, with the best known proponents being Hare and
Singer. However, the intuitions underlying the presented formalization are differ-
ent from the most common ethical intuitions in preference utilitarianism. Since
our formal preference utilitarianism is not meant to describe a decision procedure
for humans (or, more generally and in Hare’s (1981, pp. 44f.) terminology,
non-“archangels”), we do not consider an application-oriented utilitarianism like
Hare’s two-level consequentialism. (Hare, 1981, p. 25ff.) Also, most preference
utilitarians ascribe preferences only to humans (or abstract agents) and do not
contain prioritization among individuals, (Harsanyi, 1982, p. 46) or they use a
low number of classes of moral standing. (Singer, 1993, pp. 101ff., 283f.) Whereas
some have pointed out that a variety of behavior and even trivial systems can be
viewed from an “intentional stance”, (Dennett, 1971; Dennett, 1989, especially
pp. 29f.; compare Hofstadter, 2007, pp. 52ff.) only relatively recent articles in
preference utilitarianism have discussed the connection between goal-directed
behavior and ethically relevant preferences and with the universality of the
former pointed out the potential universality of the latter. (Tomasik, 2015b, ch.
7; Tomasik, 2015a, ch. 4, 6; Tomasik, 2015c) This idea is an important step
when formalizing preference utilitarianism because otherwise one would have to
define moral standing depending on other, usually binary, notions: being alive,
the ability to suffer (Bentham, 1823, ch. 17 note 122), personhood (Gruen, 2014,
ch. 1), free will, sentience and (self-)consciousness (Singer, 1993, pp. 101ff.) or
the ability of moral judgment. However, all of them seem to be very difficult
9 Specifically, the Riemann series theorem states that any conditionally convergent series
can be reordered to have arbitrary values.
10It is very important to differentiate the series from its value. Otherwise, one may identify
the series with positive or negative infinity or as being undefined. Two infinite values of the
series would then not be comparable anymore, which Bostrom (2011) identified as a problem
for (consequentialist) ethics. But this problem can sometimes be eliminated by comparing the
series itself to another. In this particular case, a history h is better than another history h′, if∑
i
∑
Spc
∑
u
u(h)P (u|(h(i)|Spc)@i)− u(h′)P (u|(h′(i)|Spc)@i) > 0,
where h(i)|Spc : Spc → S : c 7→ h(i)(c) denotes the restriction of h(i) to Spc, i.e. the structure
on Spc in the state h(i). If no such relation can be established then the two histories are
arguably incomparable or may be called approximately equally good. Again, the ordering
could be important in some cases, see footnote 9.
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sum over all agents utility of an agent∑
i
∑
str@i
∑
u
P (u|str@i)u(h)
∑
agent n∈N
Un∑
agent n∈N
wn · Un
Figure 3: Comparison between formalizations of utilitarianism. The first row
shows the formalization of this paper, the second row is adapted from Harsanyi
(1982, p. 46), and the third row from Gips (2011, p. 245). The utility of an
agent n is denoted by Un and its weight by wn.
to define (universally) in physical systems in the intended binary sense.11 Also,
continuous definitions of these terms are often connected with goal-directed
behavior. (Tomasik, 2015a, ch. 4; Wolfram, 2002, p. 1136)
Whereas most ethical work is conducted informally, (McLaren, 2011, p. 297;
Gips, 2011, p. 251) there has been some formal work at the intersection of
(utilitarian) ethics, game theory and economics, most notably by Harsanyi
(1982). Some formalization has also been conducted in the realm of machine
ethics. (M. Anderson, S. L. Anderson, and Armen, 2004; Gips, 2011, pp. 245ff.)
However, influenced by game theory and dualist traditions in philosophy, they
are based on the classic agent-environment-model as displayed in figure 1 and
assume utility functions (or even the utilities in different trajectories themselves)
as given by the world model. Nonetheless, there is at least one parallel: all
models of utilitarianism contain the notion of summing the utility over all agents.
As shown in figure 3, both the definition of all agents and how to obtain the
utility or welfare of an agent differ among formalizations.
In Artificial Intelligence, the idea of learning preferences has become more
popular, e.g. see Fu¨rnkranz and Hu¨llermeier (2010) and Nielsen and Jensen
(2004) for technical treatments or Bostrom (2014, pp. 192ff.) for an introduction
in the context of making an AI do what the engineers value. However, most of
the time, the agent is still presumed to be separated from the environment.
Nonetheless, the idea of evaluating space-time-embedded intelligence is be-
ginning to be established in artificial (general) intelligence, (Orseau and Ring,
2012) which is closely related to the probability distribution P (str@i|u).
11For example, Wolfram (2002, pp. 823-825, 1178-1180) and Emmeche (1997) discuss the
property of life, Hofstadter (2007, pp. 9-24, 51-54) discusses consciousness and Arneson (1998,
p. 5) discusses personhood.
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5 Conclusion
By reversing Dennett’s intentional stance with Bayes’ theorem, we were able to
ascribe preferences to physical objects and thus formalize preference utilitarianism
in cellular automata. Theoretically, such formalizations can function as a
specification for an artificial intelligence or more generally as a basis for “paradise
engineering” (e.g. see Ettinger, 2009, p. 124). However, there are several potential
problems that require further work before such practical applications of our
formalization or improved variations of it can be approached:
• Through sums over all structures, possible utility functions and states
and the application of incomputable concepts like Solomonoff’s prior in
P (u), our formalization is incomputable in theory and practice. So even
in simulations of cellular automata our formalization is not immediately
applicable.
• Computing our global welfare function in the real world is even more
difficult, because it requires full information about the world on particle
level. Also, the formalization must first be translated into the physical
laws of our universe.
• The difficulty to apply our formalization is by no means only relevant
to actually using it as a moral imperative. Instead, it is also relevant to
discussing our formalization from a normative standpoint: Even though the
derivation of our formalization is plausible, it may still differ significantly
from intuition. There could be some kind of trivial agents with trivial
preferences that dominate comparison of different histories. Because the
formalization’s incomputability makes it difficult to assess whether such
problems are present, further work on its potential flaws is necessary. Based
on such discussion, our formalization may be revised or even discarded. In
any case, we could learn a lot from its shortcomings especially due to the
formalization’s simplicity and plausible derivation.
• We outlined how P (str@i|u) and P (u) could be determined in principle.
However, they need to be specified more formally, which in the case
of P (str@i|u) seems to require a solution to the problem of normative
decision theory. Some problems of our formalization could inspire additional
refinements of these distributions.
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